



## **From democratic participation to civic resistance**

### **The loss of institutional trust as an outcome of activism in the refugee solidarity movement**

Toubøl, Jonas

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**Title:** From democratic participation to civic resistance: The loss of institutional trust as an outcome of activism in the refugee solidarity movement<sup>1</sup>

**Author:** Jonas Toubøl, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, jt@soc.ku.dk

**Abstract:** Adding to the literature on non-institutional political action and trust, this article argues that the loss of institutional trust is not only a cause but also an outcome of political activism. Studying the Danish refugee solidarity movement in a mixed-methods research design including survey and qualitative interview data, the article shows that three kinds of activism—*political activism*, *humanitarian activity*, and *civil disobedience*—relate differently to the loss of trust in the institutions of *the Parliament*, *the legal system*, and *the police*. Political activism primarily affects a loss of trust in the Parliament due to low external efficacy and a closed political opportunity structure. Civil disobedience affects a loss of trust in the legal system and the police due to a perceived lack of procedural justice. Humanitarian activity does not affect a loss of institutional trust because it does not imply interaction with the institutions to the same extent as the other kinds of activism. The consequence of losing trust in the political institutions is not an abandonment of democratic values, nor political apathy, but rather a change in civic engagement from a mode of democratically legitimising participation in the institutions to a mode of contending and questioning the legitimacy of the political institutions. This qualitative evidence

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indicating that loss of institutional trust may cause an increase in extra-institutional political action is consistent with the commonly assumed causality in the literature. This leads to a final integrating argument for conceptualising activism and loss of institutional trust as reinforcing factors in a process where, in line with the main finding of this study, activism may cause a loss of institutional trust which, in turn, may cause additional activism, as argued in the existing literature.

## **Introduction**

An active citizenry which engages with the central values of democracy and participates in the political institutions is of vital importance to modern democracy (Habermas, 1996; Ray, 2004). The legitimacy of democracy depends on individuals with the capacities for democratic citizenship in civil society who adhere to, as well as legitimise, political institutions due to the experience of being acknowledged through inclusion in the political process (Warren, 2011; Welzel et al., 2005; Boje, 2017). Consequently, if civil society actors begin to distrust the political institutions, the legitimacy of the very same institutions and democracy as such are in peril. This paper shows how a group of civically engaged citizens of middle-class origins are gradually turning against the political institutions which they have experienced as not adhering to the values underpinning democracy. Instead of turning their back on democratic values, the individuals intensify their civic engagement to reinstate such values and principles in the institutions. This investigation analyses how activity in the refugee solidarity movement in Denmark leads to a loss of trust in political institutions among citizens who are otherwise highly engaged in civil society and the political process.

Given a shift in political participation from institutional towards non-institutional political activity (Dalton, 2008) and political polarisation, with social movements at the heart of the process (Kriesi, 2012, 2014; McAdam and Kloos, 2014), the question of the links between social movement activity and institutional trust gains salience. Even though the proposition that political activism may lead to a loss of institutional trust generally would be acknowledged by students of social movement and political

protest, the literature on social movement outcomes, nonetheless, tends to be silent on the issue of activism and its consequences for institutional trust (Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni et al., 1999). Instead, studies of this relationship tend to view institutional trust as a cause generating activism (Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 2011; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Supplementing this approach, the overall contribution of this paper is to argue that the loss of institutional trust should also be analysed as an outcome of activism. The study suggests that the loss of institutional trust and activism should be seen as mutually reinforcing factors in a process where activism may cause a loss of trust which, in turn, may generate more activism.

The argument for how citizens are turning against the political institutions which they experience as not adhering to central democratic values follows three steps: First, the article presents data showing that citizens active in the refugee solidarity movement have lower trust in political institutions when compared with the general population, apparently because of their activity in the movement. By distinguishing between three forms of activism—*political activism*, *humanitarian activity*, and *civil disobedience*—and three institutions—*the Parliament*, *the legal system*, and *the police*—it is shown to be likely that different kinds of movement activity affect the loss of trust in different institutions. Second, exploring the social processes leading to the loss of trust in the different institutions, the article argues that the loss in trust stems from the activists' interaction with the institutions whose procedures are experienced as unfair (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix et al., 2015; Tyler, 2003) or suffering from low external efficacy (Pollock, 1983). Third, it is argued that the refugee solidarity movement mobilises a group of citizens with a strong commitment to civil society and democratic values who, as a reaction to the loss of institutional trust, change from participating in the democratically legitimising processes of the political institutions to contesting the institutions.

The first step is achieved by analyses of unique survey data consisting of 2,289 valid cases, collected in the summer of 2016. The survey enables comparison with the general Danish population as represented by the European Social Survey (ESS) and the International Social

Survey Program (ISSP). Also, 41 in-depth interviews with activists in the movement carried out during the spring of 2014 are analysed to substantiate the second step regarding the encounters with institutional actors. The third step regarding the shift in civic action uses both survey and interview data.

The following section two discusses theories concerning trust, civic action, and democracy. Section three presents the case of the September Mobilisation of the Danish Refugee Solidary Movement in relation to the massive influx of refugees to Europe in the summer of 2015. Section four explains the mixed-methods research design. Sections five, six, and seven contain the analyses of the relationship between the level and kind of activity and institutional trust, how institutional trust is lost in interaction with political institutions, and how this loss of institutional trust has consequences for civic activity. Finally, section eight concludes the analyses.

### **Activism and trust**

For a long time, the literature has asserted a crucial relationship between trust, civic action, and democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). Trust has often been divided into the categories of generalised trust and institutional trust, which are mutually connected in a positive way (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), and which influence democratic attitudes and participation (Zmerli and Newton, 2008). This study focuses on institutional trust and leaves aside the question of generalised trust.

The literature on social movement outcomes tends to be silent on the issue of activism and institutional trust (Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni et al., 1999). This is odd considering the overwhelming amount of studies on the identity-transforming (e.g., Reger et al., 2008) and radicalising effects of participation in movements (e.g., Della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1988), and most students of political activism would probably view it as quite likely that participation in activism can inflict a loss of trust in the institutions which the activists confront. Nonetheless, this is not how the relationship between activism and institutional trust is conceptualised in the literature. Rather, it is the reverse causality which

has been assumed: Several studies have found a negative relationship between institutional trust and activism which has been interpreted as low institutional trust causing political activity (Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 2011). Kaase (1999) considers that it might also be the case that activism causes a loss of trust, but he finds more support for the opposite interpretation in his empirical material. Thus, the theoretical plausibility of the causal relationship proposed by this study has been acknowledged in the literature which, however, has lacked studies empirically investigating and testing the hypothesis. In the studies arguing for activism being caused by low institutional trust, the direction of causality is assumed on theoretical grounds because the underlying data sources are cross-sectional surveys which are not well-suited to determine the direction of causality of the observed correlations due to the lack of measurement of individual variation over time. The point is not to be dismissive of this widely accepted approach. However, the lack of empirical substantiation of the assumed causality accentuates the relevance of considering the other possibility, namely, that changes in the individual's institutional trust are not only a cause but may as well be an outcome of involvement in activism.

#### *Relation of trust to partisan and order institutions*

Kaase, summarising the literature, argues that trust is relational and, therefore, its loss (or growth or stabilisation) involves interaction between actors, which can be individual, collective, and institutional or any combination of those (Kaase, 1999: 2-3). Such interactions vary among institutions, as has been convincingly argued by Rothstein and Stolle, who distinguish between *partisan institutions*, pertaining in this case to Parliament, and *neutral and order institutions*, of which the legal system and the police are examples (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008: 447–8). According to the authors, in addition to functioning as their effective agents, citizens expect political bias from partisan institutions, but impartially and neutrality from the order institutions.

For partisan institutions such as the Parliament, trust is associated with political efficacy (e.g., Craig et al., 1990; Pollock, 1983). The mechanism is that if individuals believe they lack the

competences to participate in the political process (internal efficacy), the individuals are less likely to trust the institutions. On the other hand, the political institutions' responsiveness to their demands (external efficacy) will affect their trust in them. For order institutions such as the police and legal system, there is a consensus that trust stems mainly from the procedural aspects of justice rather than their objective performance (Tyler and Huo, 2002). What matters for trust in legal institutions is having personal experiences of high levels of fairness in the exercise of legal authority (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix et al., 2015). As will be argued in the analyses below, this focus on the importance of interaction and relations offers a most relevant perspective to explain why activism may lead to a loss of trust in order institutions.

These general considerations will inform the subsequent analyses of how different kinds of social-movement-mediated interaction with political institutions can account for variation in the loss of institutional trust. This article proposes that activism is not only an important locus for such interaction, but also that different kinds of activism lead to different interactions with different institutions, potentially resulting in the loss of institutional trust.

### **Case: The September Mobilisation of the Refugee Solidary Movement**

The Danish refugee solidarity movement has been active for decades. It is a movement made up of what can be broadly characterised as middle-class people and predominantly women. Levels of income and education tend to be rather high, and the typical occupations are white collar, public-sector jobs, such as teachers, doctors, social counsellors, and the like. The level of social capital is significantly higher than that of the general population (see figure AI and table AI in the appendix), and they are also highly engaged in civil society, which will be discussed in more detail in the analysis below. In the 1980s and 1990s, the movement consisted almost exclusively of Danes from the majority culture. During the last decade or so, citizens from minority cultures with a recent family history of migration increasingly have become active in the movement, and during the mobilisation in 2015, many refugees

and non-citizen residents also became active. However, the movement is still made up predominantly of middle-class Danes of the majority culture. This socio-economic homogeneity is countered by cultural-political diversity: The movement brings together activists from Christian and Jewish congregations, networks of left-wing radicals, groups of queer activists, large national NGOs, and local community groups (Toubøl, 2015; 2017).

In early September 2015, the movement experienced an unprecedented mobilisation in relation to the unregulated arrival of an estimated 21,000 refugees (Rigspolitiet, 2015) which took the authorities by surprise and caused chaotic scenes at the borders and along the main roads and railways. In contrast to the authorities who seemed bewildered, civil society quickly reacted and organised for assisting the refugees by enacting a varied repertoire of activities ranging from humanitarian actions, such as collecting and donating items and money, political protests, such as petitions and demonstrations, to acts of civil disobedience, such as transporting refugees across the border to Sweden or Norway (tables III and AV provide overview of the repertoire, see also Gundelach and Toubøl [forthcoming]). This phenomenon was not restricted to Denmark, and similar civic action was observed all over Europe (Agustin and Jørgensen, 2018; Della Porta, 2018; Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Hamann and Karakayali, 2016; Karakayali, 2017; Zechner and Hansen, 2016).

In the Danish case, groups on the social media site Facebook became the dominant vehicle for coordination and communication within the movement. Measured by the membership of Facebook groups and pages related to the movement, within a month, the movement doubled its membership from 30,000 to 60,000, and by the end of the year 2017, it had reached 100,000 (Toubøl, 2017). Disregarding labour market conflicts, this was among the largest and most rapid mobilisations of Danish civil society since World War II. It becomes even more significant in light of the fact that, since the early 1980s, immigration-sceptical views and xenophobia had gradually become more widespread in public opinion and adopted by a widening spectrum of the political parties to the extent that a political agenda of minimising the number of immigrants and refugees in 2015 had been dominant for at least



two decades. Thus, the massive mobilisation represented an unexpected show of support for and solidarity with refugees and immigrants that, for a while, challenged the immigrant-sceptical hegemony in Danish politics (for more details on the movement, its historical background, and wider context see Toubøl [2017]).

For this study, the case is strategic for four principal reasons: 1) The fact that Facebook is widely used in Danish society and became central to the movement provides the opportunity to survey the bulk of the movement members. Often, this opportunity is unavailable to social movement researchers because of the informal nature of most movements, which lack membership records or the like that would enable the recruitment of a sufficiently large sample. The fact that the movement ‘went online’ during the summer and fall of 2015 provides us with an inclusive sampling frame. 2) The September mobilisation constitutes a public event fixed in time that people in Denmark in general and activists in particular clearly remember, which allows for better retrospective investigation of the event (Belli, 2014). 3) Focusing on a particular event allows for distinguishing between those who were active beforehand and the new activists, which presents itself as the best option for including a time dimension in a survey design when a panel study was not possible. 4) Finally, as explained above, the movement has a very broad repertoire spanning traditional forms of political action, voluntary work, and civil disobedience, which allows for the investigation of how different kinds of activity may change the activists’ trust in political institutions. The following section outlines how these research-strategic advantages of the case are used in the research design.

## **Research design**

The study exploits three data sources in a mixed-methods research design: 1) an online survey of members of the movement-related Facebook groups and pages, 2) the Danish samples of the ISSP and ESS rounds from 2014, and 3) 41 qualitative interviews with movement activists. In what follows,

methodological issues related to the three data sources and their internal relationships in the research design are considered.

1) The online survey of movement members on Facebook was carried out during the summer of 2016, inquiring about the events that took place in the fall of 2015. The questionnaire asked 73 questions about movement activities, general activity in civil society, motives for participating, political attitudes, religion, values, and individual and socio-economic characteristics. A total of 2,289 activists gave valid responses to the entire questionnaire. The sample displayed substantial variation in general and in particular on the key variables of activities, prior experience with activism, being active before September or being a newcomer, and social movement organisational (SMO) affiliation. Thus, the sample appears to include a selection of most types of activists in the movement with one important reservation. Because resources for translation of the survey into languages other than Danish were not available, activists with limited Danish language skills – including refugees and some minority Danes – are unlikely to have answered the questionnaire. Thus, the sample is not representative of this group of movement activists.

The respondents were recruited from a total population of about 100,000 Facebook users distributed among 287 Facebook groups and pages related to the movement which had been identified by a keyword search.<sup>2</sup> The recruitment was carried out by posting invitations to participate, including a link to the online survey, in the 287 groups and pages, implying that the respondents self-selected to participate. Because we do not have the necessary data on the 100,000 members, we cannot assess how representative of the movement the self-selected sample is. Even if we could, non-Facebook users comprise a minor part of the movement. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the survey constitutes a

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<sup>2</sup> Keywords: *refugee* (flygtning), *asylum* (asyl), *racism* (racism), *foreigner* (udlænding), *Venligbo* (the Danish nomination for a large and new social movement which has kindness towards refugees and others in need as its central goal), *friends of refugees* (flygtningevenner), *intercultural* (interkulturel), *the Red Cross* (Røde Kors), *the Red Cross Youth* (Røde Kors Ungdom), *the Danish Refugee Council* (Dansk Flygtningehjælp), *DFUNK* (the Danish Refugee Council's youth organisation), *Frivillignet* (the Danish Refugee Council volunteer organisations), *Save The Children* (Red Barnet), *Save The Children Youth* (Red Barnet Ungdom), and *Amnesty International*.

representative sample of the movement because the delimitation of the movement population is, in practice, impossible, as is often the case with studies of social movements.

However, some administrators of Facebook groups and pages offered to circulate the link among members who were not on Facebook. This resulted in responses from 42 non-Facebook users. Aside from being, on average, three years older, having a higher proportion of men, and, quite naturally, a lower rate of participation in social media activities, the non-Facebook users are not significantly different from the Facebook users in the sample. This indicates that the sampling frame's exclusion of non-Facebook-users is likely to be unproblematic by itself.

In sum, the fact that the sample cannot claim to be representative of the movement population implies that, in the subsequent empirical analysis, we are not interested in generalising variable distributions from the sample to the population. Instead, we focus on the relationships between variables which are likely to be less biased than would be the case with the variable distributions (Søgaard et al., 2004).

2) To compare patterns in the movement sample with the general population, we use the Danish samples of the ISSP and ESS rounds in 2014. The comparison is made possible by replicating several questions from the ISSP and ESS in the questionnaire of the movement survey. It is important to be aware that the comparisons in the subsequent analysis are only between the sample of the Danish population and the movement sample because the movement sample's generalisability cannot be determined, as explained above, in contrast to the population samples. Attempting to remedy this shortcoming, in addition to the descriptive statistics, statistical testing is provided to control for selection bias when such comparisons are undertaken.

3) A total of 42 qualitative interviews with as many movement activists were carried out in the spring of 2014. They make up a total of 65.5 hours of recorded conversation and vary in length from 23 minutes to 2 hours and 28 minutes. The sampling of interview persons aimed at maximal variation regarding SMO affiliation, experience and activities, age, and geography. Thus, the aim was to get to

know as many corners of this very diverse movement as possible. In general, and like the survey sample, the interview persons have an upper-middle-class background, and long-cycle higher education is common, as well as a strong political left-leaning. However, there are exceptions, and the sample covers the entire educational hierarchy and also includes a few politically right-leaning cases (for more information about the empirical data material see Toubøl (2017)).

The interviews serve both as a source of substantial knowledge about the movement, vital in the construction of the survey mentioned above, and an important source of knowledge regarding the exact processes underpinning the observed variable relationships. In this study, it is in the second capacity that they are used to unpack and provide empirical substance to connections indicated by the quantitative analyses.


To this end, the fact that the interviews were collected two years before the survey was conducted presents a potential problem. However, when it comes to the relationships between activists and political institutions, which is the focus of the empirical analysis, nothing gives a reason to believe that the relationships should have changed significantly. That is, no overall policy change or change in public opinion and discourse regarding the issues of refugees and immigration occurred in the period, nothing that ought to have inflicted changes in institutional practice or made the activists' views more or less favourable. If anything, the regulation became stricter and likely to intensify the patterns observed in 2014. Thus, even though the massive influx of refugees and mobilisation of activists in 2015 magnified the scope of activity and intensified the political debate, it is assumed that the refugee solidarity activists' experiences and views of the political institutions in 2014 do not differ significantly from those of 2016.

In what follows, sparse background information is provided, and identities are obscured to ensure the interviewees remain anonymous. These measures are deemed necessary as several of those interviewed have been involved in illegal acts of civil disobedience. Thus, disclosure would potentially put the interviewees at risk of legal prosecution.

## The relationship between activity and institutional trust

The analysis proceeds first by considering survey data suggesting that a loss of institutional trust has occurred in relation to movement activity. To analyse different kinds of activism in relation to the loss of trust in different institutions, three scales of activism are inductively derived. Then the question of the different kinds of activities' effects on the loss of trust in different kinds of political institutions is scrutinised using survey data and data from the interviews. Finally, the likely consequences following the loss of trust are analysed.

Figure I. Average trust in institutions on a scale from 0-10. Comparing the Danish population and the movement sample



\*=p<.05; \*\*=p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

<sup>1</sup> Controls included: *gender, age, civil status, children at home, residential area's degree of urbanisation, education, employment status, born in Denmark or not, self-transcending values, values of self-enhancement, political orientation, member of Danish national church, church attendance frequency, history of activism*. For estimates see appendix Tables AII-AIV.

n=3,452

Population-sample is ESS-2014-DK.

Figure I presents a comparison between the general Danish population and the movement sample. The pattern is similar to what has been observed in the literature (Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Kaase 1999), namely, a lower level of institutional trust among the activists than the general population.

However, the answers to the follow-up question summarised in table I indicate that the observed lower level of institutional trust in figure I is not just the cause but should also be considered an outcome of activism: Table I shows that significant proportions of the respondents answered that, as a consequence of being involved in the refugee cause, they lost trust in Parliament (65 per cent), the legal system (21 per cent), and the police (10 per cent). With the notable exception of the police,<sup>3</sup> hardly any respond that their trust has increased. In total, 69 per cent of the activists had lost trust in one or more institutions. These figures provide a strong indication of participation in movement activism being a cause of a loss of institutional trust, and not only an outcome.

Table I. Distribution of answers to the question ‘Have what you learned and your experiences with the refugee cause changed your trust in the following institutions?’

Institution	Yes, my trust has increased		Yes, my trust has declined		No, it did not change	
	n	per cent	n	per cent	n	per cent
Parliament	23	1	1483	65	764	34
Legal System	50	2	487	21	1729	76
The Police	277	12	227	10	1761	78

Scrutinising the numbers from table I, the first thing to consider is the possibility that the observed drop in institutional trust is not due to involvement in movement activity but selection bias. Figure II is the smoothed means of the modelled relationships between the number of activities an activist has participated in and the loss of institutional trust in the Parliament, the legal system, and the police. The three dependent variables are binaries constructed from the question presented in table I with an outcome of 1 if the respondent reported a decline of institutional trust in Parliament, the legal system, and the police due to being involved in the refugee cause and 0 if trust in the institutions did not

<sup>3</sup> The relatively large share of activists responding that their trust in the police has increased is likely due to the perceived relative positive role played by the police in September 2015. Generally, the police were depicted in the press as handling the refugees very humanely. This tended to overshadow reports of confrontations between activists, refugees, and the police. From the point of view of the activists, this positive image of the police’s handling of the situation might, in part, explain the large share of activists whose trust in the police has increased.

change or increased. It includes a wide range of controls listed in table II. The relationships between the number of activities and the loss of institutional trust are all statistically significant. The functional form of the relationships depicted in figure II is roughly linear in all cases.


Table II. Logistic regression of the probability for the loss of institutional trust by number of activities

Covariates	Parliament		Legal system		Police	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
<u>Focal variable</u>						
Number of activities (0-16)	0.167***	0.024	0.130***	0.025	0.090**	0.034
<u>Control variables</u>						
Income (1-10)	-0.114	0.064	-0.177*	0.075	-0.137	0.106
<i>Occupation</i>						
Full time	Reference		Reference		Reference	
Part time	0.108	0.203	0.038	0.240	0.030	0.344
Self-employed	-0.101	0.199	0.602*	0.221	0.229	0.343
Education	0.031	0.247	-0.001	0.270	-0.518	0.371
Unemployed	0.048	0.328	0.585	0.340	-0.020	0.478
Early retiree	0.048	0.303	0.469	0.322	0.134	0.455
Pensioner	-0.154	0.255	0.277	0.300	0.385	0.415
Other	-0.299	0.249	0.278	0.293	0.338	0.399
Work time (1-5)	-0.041	0.049	0.034	0.060	-0.055	0.088
Education (1-5)	0.024	0.057	-0.090	0.062	-0.137	0.083
<i>Gender</i>						
Female	Reference		Reference		Reference	
Male	-0.100	0.146	0.023	0.170	0.612**	0.205
Do not identify as either	-1.454*	0.642	0.054	0.686	1.259	0.711
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	-0.015	0.044	-0.037	0.049	0.050	0.067
Children in household (0-1)	-0.044	0.122	-0.125	0.139	-0.532**	0.199
Age (Years)	0.009	0.006	-0.004	0.007	-0.016	0.009
Refugee (0-1)	-0.411	0.312	0.034	0.321	-0.324	0.400
Active in party (0-1)	-0.395*	0.175	0.021	0.199	0.154	0.256
Active in union (0-1)	-0.094	0.163	0.002	0.189	0.060	0.251
Active in religious ass. (0-1)	0.088	0.188	-0.500*	0.234	0.133	0.313
Active in sports ass. (0-1)	-0.178	0.112	-0.078	0.133	-0.257	0.191
Active in other ass. (0-1)	-0.173	0.113	0.021	0.128	0.001	0.175
Active prior to Sept. (0-1)	0.081	0.107	0.127	0.125	0.270	0.177
History of other act. (0-6)	-0.010	0.042	-0.051	0.053	-0.088	0.077
History of refugee act. (0-5)	0.042	0.055	0.034	0.064	0.163	0.088
Self-transcendent val. (1-8)	0.128***	0.029	0.086*	0.035	0.090	0.049
Self-enhancement val. (1-8)	0.060	0.037	-0.012	0.042	0.061	0.058
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.278***	0.061	-0.152*	0.072	-0.349**	0.105
<i>Religion</i>						
None	Reference		Reference		Reference	
National Danish Church	0.001	0.131	-0.142	0.153	-0.122	0.219
Islam	-0.163	0.389	0.400	0.382	0.846	0.459
Other	0.140	0.263	0.247	0.263	0.343	0.340
Church attendance freq.(1-5)	-0.013	0.061	0.085	0.070	0.029	0.097
Generalized trust (1-4)	-0.095	0.099	-0.189	0.113	-0.080	0.153

Constant	0.748	0.855	-0.696	0.926	-0.658	1.218
Degrees of freedom=33	n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.072		n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.064		n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.099	

Notes: Coefficients are log odds.  
 \*=p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*=p<0.001

Figure II. Probability of the loss of institutional trust by number of activities participated in



Notes: Prediction lines are kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the predicted values for loss of trust by number of activities. The model estimates are reported in table II.

Considering the controls, political attitudes matter in the sense that the more right-leaning one's political views are, the less probable is a loss of trust in all three political institutions. Also, the value scale of self-transcendence – constructed on the basis of Schwartz's basic human values (Davidov et al., 2008; Schwartz, 1992) combining values of universalism and benevolence – has a significant effect on



the likelihood of losing trust in the Parliament and the legal system. It suggests that the more your basic values involve caring for other people and being aware that your fortune depends on the people around you, and vice versa, the more probable it is that you lose trust in the political institutions. Finally, attention should be directed to the absence of effects of some prominent variables in the literature on movement participation. History of activism (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991) is represented by two variables measuring the number of activities the activist has been involved in before September in relation to 1) the refugee issue and 2) other political issues. History of activism concerns the experience of the activists. The variables' effects on the outcome variables are insignificant.<sup>4</sup> The same is the case with the variable measuring whether the activists were active before September enabling us to distinguish between veteran activists who were integrated into activist networks when the events unfolded in September and novice activists recruited during or after September (McAdam, 1986; Schussman and Soule, 2005). The insignificant estimates indicate that the effects are similar for novice as well as veteran activists, and prior experience and network integration have little to say in this regard. Rather, it is identity measured by values and political attitudes that matter, in addition to the level of participation in activities during September.

These findings strengthen the hypothesis that the loss of institutional trust is a common consequence of participation in activism. Taking this as a point of departure, what follows aims at unravelling in detail how participating in the movement activities affects a loss of institutional trust.

#### *Different outcomes of different activities*

Inspection of the 16 items in the survey that measure activities makes it clear that the different activities do not relate in the same way to the loss in trust in the three political institutions (cf. appendix, table

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<sup>4</sup> The resemblance of the focal variable, *number of activities* and the history of activism variables raises the suspicion that the same thing is measured twice. However, the estimated effects of the two histories of activism variables remain insignificant if excluding *number of activities* from the model except for *history of refugee activism* becoming significant under the  $p < 0.05$  level in relation to loss of trust in the police. Thus, in relation to the case under study, the conclusion that history of activism in general does not influence loss of institutional trust seems valid with the possible exception of in relation to the police.

AV). This suggests that different activities may give rise to different kinds of experiences that can result in a loss of trust in the different institutions. To scrutinise this hypothesis, three scales were constructed from the activities – *political activism*, *civil disobedience*, and *humanitarian activity*—as summarised in table III. These scales are the result of a procedure of optimising Chronbach’s alpha.

Their denominations are the result of interpreting the commonality of the activities on each scale.

Whereas the civil disobedience and humanitarian activity scales are quite clear-cut, political activism is more complex because, in addition to the classical forms of political protest of petitioning and demonstrating, it also covers a few common low-cost and low-risk activities (McAdam, 1986) such as activity on Facebook or the collection and donation of goods. These activities are not per se political in a contentious sense, even though they might be, and donations of goods were certainly considered as such in the politically tense days of early September 2015. However, when they are included in a scale with political activism, it is due to this being the best solution from a technical point of view as they do not make up a good scale on their own or combined with any of the activities. Thus, it should be kept in mind that political activism also covers forms of mixed activities.

Table III. Activity scales

Activities	Activity scales		
	Political activism	Civil disobedience	Humanitarian activity
1. Posting on Facebook	×		
2. Liking and sharing Facebook posts	×		
3. Petitioning	×		
4. Collecting and donating stuff	×		
5. Collecting and donating money	×		
6. Intercultural activity			×
7. Contact person for refugees			×
8. Demonstrations and events	×		
9. Civil disobedience/direct action		×	
10. Legal assistance			×
11. Assisting newly arrived refugees			×

12. Illegal transportation of refugees	×	
13. Hiding refugees from authorities	×	
14. Economic support to underground refugees	×	
15. Other support to underground refugees	×	
16. Refugees living in private home		×

The three kinds of activities are far from equally common. Almost all the respondents have performed political activities (95.8 per cent); humanitarian activism is also rather common (66.6 per cent), whereas civil disobedience is quite rare (8.2 per cent). From this, it follows logically that it is common to have performed more than one kind of activism. For instance, among 180 respondents who have been involved in civil disobedience, 73.3 per cent have been engaged in both political and humanitarian activism as well. Of the 1,469 humanitarians active, only 5.9 per cent were not also engaged in political activism.

Table IV. Logistic statistical analyses of the relationship between the activity and the loss of trust in institutions

Covariates	Only focal relations			Including all controls <sup>1</sup>			Reduced final models <sup>2</sup>		
	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Legal syst.</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Legal syst.</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Legal syst.</i>	<i>Police</i>
Political activism (0-6)	.272*** (.030)	.172*** (.036)	.132** (.049)	.237*** (.033)	.145*** (.039)	.101 <sup>×</sup> (.054)	.235*** (.032)	.145*** (.038)	.105* (.052)
Civil disobedience (0-2)	.236 (.154)	.380** (.129)	.685*** (.150)	.293 <sup>×</sup> (.164)	.418** (.139)	.574** (.167)	.294 <sup>×</sup> (.161)	.389** (.134)	.586*** (.161)
Humanitarian activism (0-4)	.058 (.046)	.074 (.050)	-.049 (.069)	.029 (-.049)	.049 (.054)	-.072 (.076)	.043 (.047)	.070 (.051)	-.059 (.071)
Number of observation (d.f.)	1,912 (3)			1,912 (34)			1,912 (14)		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.043	.025	.028	.078	.066	.107	.070	.055	.089

Notes: Coefficients are log odds (S.E.).

<sup>×</sup>=p<0.1, \* =p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*=p<0.001

<sup>1</sup> Controls included. Individual characteristics: *gender, age, children in household, civil status, residential area's degree of urbanisation, being a refugee*. Socio-economic status: *income, occupation, working time, education*. Civil society relations: *active in political party, active in religious association, active in labour union, active in sports association, active in other association, prior history of other activism, prior history of refugee activism*. Values and attitudes: *self-transcendent values, self-enhancement values, political left-right scale, religion, church attendance, generalised trust*. See table AVI in the appendix for estimates of all variables in the models.

<sup>2</sup> See table AVII in the appendix for estimates of all variables in the models.

Table IV reports the results of the statistical analysis of the three activity scales and their relationship to the loss of trust in the three institutions. The table contains only estimates for the focal variables (for

estimates of the control variables, see appendix, tables AVI-AVII). The first block of models includes only the focal relationships. Political activism has a significant and positive relation to the loss of trust in all three institutions. Civil disobedience influences only the legal system and the police, and humanitarian activism does not influence a loss of trust in any of the institutions. In the second block, all the controls listed in the notes are included (for an estimate of all variables included, consult table AVI in the appendix). In the reduced models, all controls which did not have a significant effect on any of the dependent variables have been removed (for an estimate of all variables included, consult table AVII in the appendix). The only change regarding the focal relationships when including all controls is that political activism's effect on the loss of trust in the police becomes insignificant (still,  $p < 0.1$ ). The estimated effect of civil disobedience on the loss of trust in Parliament increases to some extent, but it is still insignificant. The reduced model differs only regarding the relation between political activism and trust in the police which becomes significant again. Overall, the pattern of the effects of the controls is similar to what was observed in the above analysis of the relationship between the number of activities and the loss of institutional trust.

The test reveals a pattern summarised in table V. *Humanitarian activities*, such as organising intercultural events, assisting newly arrived refugees, or providing legal assistance, tend not to affect a loss of trust in any of the three institutions. *Political activism*, on the other hand, tends to be associated with a loss of trust in all three institutions, with the effect on trust in Parliament being by far the strongest. The estimated effect on trust in the police is small and not significant when including all controls and, therefore, not as robust as the others indicated by the brackets. The effects of *civil disobedience* on the loss of trust in the legal system, and especially the police, are considerably larger and significant.

Table V. Summary of the effects of activism on the loss of institutional trust

	Parliament	Legal system	Police
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Political activism	×	×	(×)
Civil disobedience	-	×	×
Humanitarian activity	-	-	-

### **Trust and interaction with political institutions**

The above quantitative analysis identifies a rather clear pattern of the relationships between different kinds of activism and the loss of trust in different political institutions. In this section, an interpretation of these relationships is presented and substantiated through analysis of 42 qualitative interviews. Most of the interviewed activists, including those quoted below, have substantial experience with the workings of the civil service and legal authorities, partly from their working lives in professions such as teaching, medicine, and ministry in the national church, and in some cases from serving as elected officials and engagement in civil society organisations. The point is, they are far from novices regarding the principles and inner workings of the civil service, and their experiences and reactions can thus not be ascribed to a general ignorance of the executive dimension of the institutions.

The quotes below are selected because they express a general pattern in the interviews. As explained in the methods section, identities have been distorted to secure anonymity as some have been involved in potentially illegal activities. Thus, background information, names, places, and so forth have been altered but still resemble the sociological factors of importance to interpretation.

The theory section introduced a distinction between partisan institutions such as the Parliament, where trust related to efficacy, and neutral-order institutions such as the legal system and police, where trust related to procedural justice. This distinction orders the following analyses.

#### *Trust in partisan institutions*

Among the interviewees, internal efficacy did not seem to be the problem. However, external efficacy was extremely low. Many perceived the political opportunity structure (Meyer, 2004) to be closed, and

they were frustrated by how it was seemingly impossible to get the politicians to respond to their demands. For example, Kirsten, a leader of a minor NGO, with a long history of activism by both institutional and non-institutional means, summarises the relations to the ministers of the right-wing government of 2001-2011 in this way:

Actually, they got worse and worse, the ministers of integration. I think it was three awful ministers. [...] Especially Birthe Rønn, extremely rude and condescending in her way of speaking about the asylum seekers sometimes. So, we understood that there was no possibility of dialogue at that level.

Hopes were high in 2011 when a shift in government from an immigration-sceptical right-wing government to a centre-left government occurred. However, when it turned out that the new government would not implement any major political changes pertaining to immigration and refugees, disappointment became widespread, as another activist, Hans, summarises below regarding his network's experience with the new government:

Then I said, 'Now we have a good government, now we can take it easy', and then we continued at a reduced level of activity for a while. But as so many others, we got disappointed by that government, and well, then we must take another stint, so I am back in the coordinating committee, and I write flyers again, and the other day I attended a demonstration I organised.

Overall, relations with political actors resulting in a loss of institutional trust are mediated. In both quotes, the impression of 'no possibility of dialogue' and becoming 'disappointed by that government' stems, in part, from direct interaction such as contacting the minister. However, it derives more from political communication in various media. Such mediated interactions through, for instance, mass-media engage most people, and it is, therefore, not surprising that a loss of trust in partisan institutions is the most widespread form of loss of trust and is associated with the most common form of activism,

namely political activism. In contrast, the interactions related to trust in the order institutions are of a much more particular kind.

### *Trust in order institutions*

As explained above, trust in order institutions has been linked to the level of procedural justice, meaning fairness in the interaction between citizen and institutional actors (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix et al., 2015; Tyler and Huo, 2002). ‘Fairness’ concerns both the outcome and the fairness of the procedure used to arrive at such decisions, but the procedural fairness tends to have primacy as the willingness to accept an outcome regarded as unfair increases if the procedure to get there was experienced as fair (Tyler, 2003). The locus of experienced fairness is in the encounters and interaction with the individual actors of the legal institutions: police officers, judges, clerks, and so forth. Correct and acceptable behaviour on the part of the institutional actors in the legal procedure is essential to citizens’ experiences of them as fair, which is the main determinant of the legitimacy and level of trust in legal institutions (Creutzfeldt and Bradford, 2016; Sprott and Greene, 2010; Tankebe, 2013).

This overall insight, that an experience of fair procedures in interactions with institutional actors is key for institutional trust and legitimacy, is supported by the qualitative empirical material, from which a couple of cases shall be examined. In the first, the activist Jesper assists an underground refugee who has decided to come ‘above ground’. The activist makes a deal with the local police guaranteeing safe conduct for the refugee. However, things turn out differently at the police station:

Jesper: Then, in the middle of the meeting, they read out an arrest order, and we are all shocked.

Interviewer: What do you feel in that situation?

Jesper: Rage. I seriously considered pushing the police officer aside and saying, ‘Now we run!’ Then I scolded them, and they stated, ‘We are just performing our duty’, and then I said, ‘That, you are not! You promised safe conduct, and you have not kept your promise.’ Then I told them a story from my childhood about my father who, during World War II,

had a factory in which he hid a lot of police officers from the Germans who were arresting the Danish police. 'Should my father then just have turned them over to the authorities or what?' Then the police officer got very silent. I have never seen a police officer make such a strange face.

Overall, from the encounter in the quote above and also from numerous other interactions with the police, both in writing and from telephone conversations, Jesper got a 'very wicked impression' of the police, even though he underlines that he did 'encounter police officers who behaved properly' and that he does not claim that all police officers are wicked. Shortly after this episode, he encountered the legal system and had many communications with the civil servants in the Immigration Service on behalf of the refugee:

Jesper: In general, I am deeply shocked by the Danish police. And the same with the judge who ruled in his case. It is demeaning; it is not worthy of the judiciary. Passing one pro forma verdict after the other. And the officials [...] who in their letters where they factually list all the legal criteria relevant to the case, and then, in the conclusion, ignore what is to the benefit of the family and only take into consideration what fits the conclusion, which is pre-determined. That, in my opinion, is not proper conduct by a civil servant. A minister can do such things; they are just politicians. But when senior civil servants perform such acts, that is shocking.

Interviewer: How did it change your view of the system?

Jesper: I do not trust it. And that in general. I will always be very critical and inquire into different cases in the future. I think the Danish legal system is on top compared internationally, but it is far from ideal. Not even close. Thus, when I read the paper and watch the news, then I have a different view of some verdicts, which I probably did not have before. A much more critical view.



In this quote, it becomes very clear that it is the experience of a lack of neutrality within legal institutions that provokes him and results in a clearly indicated loss of trust in the legal system when he replies that he does 'not trust it' when asked how it changed his 'view of the system'. He then continues explaining how, in the future, he will be more critical of the legal system's decisions than he was before. Jesper's line of reasoning is also in line with Rothstein and Stolle's distinction between partisan and order institutions when he distinguishes between politicians, who he accepts are biased, as opposed to civil servants, from whom he expects impartiality.

The experience of a lack of objectivity and impartiality in the procedures of the legal institutions is common among the interviewees and is viewed as unacceptable and damaging for trust in the institutions. The experience that the basic principle of equality before the law is not being applied to the refugees led another activist, Bent, to consider the legitimacy of the law:


Interviewer: What do you experience when you receive such a rejection letter from the ministry?

Bent: Well, you actually experience, that it is a banana republic. It was absolutely evident that this woman must be given humanitarian asylum, but the conclusion is a rejection. And there was nothing to do. The decision was made in advance. [...]

We grew up with the tripartite division of power, and we grew up believing in the incorruptibility of the judiciary, and when you experience that something like the Refugee Appeals Board suddenly gets politically infected in a way that fits the political system, then you get very, very sad about your country. It was a horrifying awakening. [...] In a democratic country like ours, to me it shows, how short a distance there is between what we believe in and fight for and something very, very atrocious, how easily it may change and how careful we must be to avoid this from happening. [...] We cannot trust that right is right. And, therefore, it becomes legitimate to do something that is very illegal, you get a duty to do what is not legal. That is what you feel.

This quote brings attention to how the procedural aspect of the law is crucial to the authority of the law. The experience that the legal institutions have become partisan makes Bent lose trust in them when he concludes that ‘we cannot trust that right is right’ and then extends the line of reasoning to an argument for ‘a duty to do what is not legal’. Bent’s experience and reasoning are in line with the theory of procedural justice that posits that unfair procedures experienced in interaction with the legal authorities undermine not just trust in the legal institutions but also the legitimacy and the authority of the law.

Figure III. Average support of democratic rights on a scale from 1-7. Comparing the Danish population and the movement sample



$\gamma$ -value (ASE)	.334 (.027)	.407 (.025)	.033 (.024)	.273 (.021)	.280 (.026)
$\chi^2$ -value	139.334***	216.265***	22.861**	180.460***	108.212***
OLS-regres. coef. (S.E) <sup>1</sup>	.079 <sup>x</sup> (.042)	.178*** (.041)	-.141* (.056)	.443*** (.081)	.216*** (.046)

<sup>x</sup>=p<0.1; \*=p<0.05; \*\*=p<0.01; \*\*\*=p<0.001.

<sup>1</sup>Controls included: *gender, age, education, employment status, children at home, civil status, residential area's degree of urbanisation, political attitude, history of activism*. See appendix, tables AVIII-AXII.

n=3,092

Population-sample is ISSP-2014-DK.

## Consequences for civic activity

Finally, the consequences of this loss of institutional trust will be analysed. First, the loss of trust in political institutions seems not to be related to a rejection of democratic values. Figure III shows that support for basic democratic values among the movement sample is higher than among the general population with the exception of whether ‘more opportunities for participation in decision-making are needed’. Thus, support for the values and principles that the political institutions ought to represent, according to the ideals of democracy (Habermas, 1996), seems not to be affected negatively. Hence, the loss of institutional trust should be specified as a loss of trust in the institution’s ability to function in accordance with these democratic ideals.

Second, it would be very wrong to conclude that the studies suggesting that loss of trust leads to extra-institutional political action are wrong. Even though the loss of trust is found to be an outcome of activism in this study, it does not exclude the opposite causality. It appears quite plausible that the next step in the process from the loss of institutional trust due to activism is a change of the political action repertoire, which implies less participation in institutional politics and increased extra-institutional political action, which would explain the observation that the loss of trust leads to activism. As table VI shows, even before the events of September 2015 and except for petitioning and donating money, the newly engaged movement activists were already significantly more active in the political process by both institutional and non-institutional means compared to the general population. Thus, they are not new to political action. As a final point of the analysis, we will consider the possibility that the loss of trust may affect a change in their repertoire from institutional to extra-institutional politics and thereby that the loss of trust due to activism may, in turn, cause an increase in activism.

Table VI. Political activity prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and novice activists recruited in September

Political activity	Descriptive %		Models <sup>1</sup>	
	Population	Movement	Odds Ratio	S.E.
Petitioning	43.23	29.55	0.506***	0.048
Product boycott	19.57	25.53	1.340**	0.143
Demonstration	26.00	45.53	1.923***	0.181

Political meeting	29.18	35.68	1.372**	0.132
Contacted politician	15.70	20.60	1.345*	0.155
Donated money	21.90	23.23	1.047	0.111
Contacted media	11.83	18.09	1.665***	0.209
Expressed opinion on the Internet	8.99	14.57	1.878***	0.264

Notes: \*= $p<0.05$ , \*\*= $p<0.01$ , \*\*\*= $p<0.001$ .

<sup>1</sup> Controls included in the logistic regressions: *gender, age, civil status, children living at home, employment, education, residential area's degree of urbanisation*. For estimates see appendix, tables AXIII-AXX.

Population-sample is ISSP-2014-DK (n=1747). Movement-sample is activists not active in the movement prior to September 2015 (n=982).

The interviews point to the plausibility of such a change related to a change in their view of the legitimacy of political institutions, as a consequence of entering into *conflict with the institutions themselves* as opposed to *contending with political opponents in the institutions*. The following quote from the activist Karen serves to illustrate this:

The refugee came and said that she would be deported, and brought a pile of papers, and I knew nothing about all this, it was an unknown country to me back then, and I thought ‘This cannot be true, there is civil war in their home country’, [...] but the more I read, the more I could see in writing that she was going to be deported, and then I thought: ‘What do you do? What do you do?’ And then I came to think of my time in Amnesty, so I organised a petition. And then I thought, ‘This is what you do in Amnesty, it is kind of rude when you think about it. We live in Denmark. Here is rule of law. It is no dictatorship, and then you have to use the same methods as when confronting a dictatorship.’ I tell you, my world was turned upside down!

In this quote, Karen, a middle-aged citizen who, in general, takes an active part in the local life in her neighbourhood, experiences how the institutions that should uphold democratic values have been corrupted. In response, and to her surprise, she is transformed from citizen to activist, employing non-institutional political means that she imports from a different context, first, to help the refugees who are the victims of failing democratic institutions and then to pursue an implied secondary goal of reinstating the democratic values and principles. In short, to many of the interviewed activists, civil society has changed from a site of inclusion in the political process that underpins the legitimacy of the

democracy that they strongly support to a site of organising resistance against what they experience as the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 2004) as illustrated by the quotes from both Karen and Bent.

In sum, the analysis uncovers a processual interaction between activism and institutional trust: Activism may cause a loss of institutional trust that, in turn, may cause more activism due to a shift in action repertoire from institutional to extra-institutional political action. The shift is a reaction to the loss of institutional trust and accompanying dissatisfaction caused by perceived lack of procedural justice as well as low external efficacy which results in the institutions being viewed as failing the ideals of democratic rule of law and rational democratic deliberation and inclusion (Harrebye & Ejrnæs, 2015; Norris, 1999; 2011).

## **Conclusion**

This article has analysed the relationship between movement activity and loss of institutional trust as an outcome of the activity to supplement the existing literature, which views a loss of institutional trust as a cause of non-institutional political activity. It has shown that movement activity is linearly related to the likelihood of losing trust in institutions, and survey data strongly indicates that activism causes the loss of trust. While maintaining that the loss of trust may very well lead to activism, the overall contribution is to show that the reverse causal relationship is just as likely. This, in turn, questions the interpretation of the empirical findings in cross-sectional survey studies which assume that the loss of trust causes activism (e.g., Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013).

The analyses show that the loss of trust in the institutions of the Parliament, the legal system, and the police is related to different kinds of activism. Political activism, which is by far the most common form of activism, relates to a loss of trust in partisan institutions and only to a lesser degree in order institutions, whereas civil disobedience is not related to a loss of trust in partisan institutions but in the order institutions. Humanitarian activity is not associated with a loss of trust in any of the three institutions.

Interview data suggest that the loss of trust in partisan institutions on the one side and the order institutions on the other is due to different logics of interaction. The loss of trust in partisan institutions is due to low external efficacy, and particularly in the perception of the political opportunity structure as closed. The interactions are typically mediated through media and the public debate. On the other hand, interactions with order institutions are particular, usually in relation to a specific refugee and often face-to-face. Here, the loss of trust is due to the experience of unfair procedures and the lack of objectivity and impartiality in the order institutions.

The consequence is not lower support for democratic values but a sceptical attitude towards the institutions which are experienced as not observing the democratic values and principles from which they draw their legitimacy. Therefore, those affected may change their civil activity from legitimising participation in the institutionalised political process to a critical stance towards the institution aiming at reinstating the values and principles they believe should inhabit the political institutions. Here, the traditionally assumed causality is at play because the loss of trust due to activism results, in turn, in a shift from institutional to extra-institutional political activism.

If such loss of institutional trust is general for the hundreds of thousands of Europeans who were mobilised during the summer and fall of 2015, such a movement outcome constitutes a potential threat to the legitimacy of the political institutions of Western democracy. In this way, the study sheds light on a hitherto largely overlooked element in the Western democratic crisis: In addition to right-wing populism (Bonikowski Bart, 2017) and traditional left-wing mobilisation of the economically deprived, the refugee solidarity movement mobilisation's alienating effects on the civically engaged middle class should be considered. The paradoxical consequence of this mobilisation in defence of humanistic and democratic values may be increasing resistance to the political institutions from the part of civil society that used to legitimise them because they experience that the institutions—in relation to refugees and immigrants—do not adhere to the values underpinning Western democracy.



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
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## Appendix

Figure AI. Generalized trust. Comparing Danish population and movement sample



\*\*\*=p<.001

<sup>1</sup> The following controls were included: *Gender, age, education, employment status, children at home, civil status, residence degree of urbanization, prior history of activism, political attitude*. See table A4 in appendix for estimates.

n=3,941

Population is the ISSP-2014 Danish sample.

Table AI. Generalized trust (1-4). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.261	0.022	0.000	0.218	0.304
Male (0-1)	-0.034	0.021	0.111	-0.076	0.008
Age (Years)	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.003
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.061	0.009	0.000	0.043	0.078
Job status (0-1)	0.054	0.020	0.008	0.014	0.094
Children in household (0-1)	0.018	0.021	0.399	-0.024	0.060
Civil status (0-1)	0.033	0.021	0.115	-0.008	0.075
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5)	-0.005	0.010	0.580	-0.024	0.014
History of activism (0-2)	0.016	0.005	0.002	0.006	0.026
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.022	0.004	0.000	-0.030	-0.015
Constant	2.660	0.060	0.000	2.543	2.777

n=3,732. R<sup>2</sup>=.126. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AII. Trust in parliament (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	-0.837	0.106	0.000	-1.045	-0.630
Male (0-1)	0.370	0.099	0.000	0.176	0.565
Age (Years)	-0.013	0.003	0.000	-0.018	-0.007
Self-transcendent values (0-4)	-0.067	0.034	0.048	-0.134	0.000
Self-enhancement values (0-4)	0.063	0.070	0.365	-0.074	0.200
Civil status (0-1)	0.403	0.093	0.000	0.220	0.585
Children in household (0-1)	-0.185	0.099	0.060	-0.378	0.008
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.116	0.035	0.001	0.048	0.184
Political attitude (0-10)	0.092	0.019	0.000	0.055	0.130
Member of national church (0-1)	0.487	0.094	0.000	0.304	0.671
Church attendance frequency (1-5)	0.060	0.039	0.128	-0.017	0.138
Born in Denmark (0-1)	-0.229	0.185	0.216	-0.591	0.134
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.286	0.040	0.000	0.208	0.365
Job status (0-1)	-0.045	0.093	0.632	-0.227	0.138
History of activism (0-2)	0.180	0.049	0.000	0.084	0.276
Constant	4.260	0.316	0.000	3.641	4.879

n=3,452. R<sup>2</sup>=.099. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AIII. Trust in legal system (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	-0.249	0.092	0.007	-0.428	-0.069
Male (0-1)	0.210	0.086	0.014	0.042	0.378
Age (Years)	0.003	0.003	0.280	-0.002	0.008
Self-transcendent values (0-4)	0.011	0.029	0.716	-0.047	0.069
Self-enhancement values (0-4)	-0.057	0.061	0.346	-0.176	0.062
Civil status (0-1)	0.304	0.081	0.000	0.146	0.462
Children in household (0-1)	-0.063	0.085	0.461	-0.230	0.104
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.103	0.030	0.001	0.044	0.162
Political attitude (0-10)	0.078	0.017	0.000	0.046	0.111
Member of national church (0-1)	0.358	0.081	0.000	0.198	0.517
Church attendance frequency (1-5)	-0.005	0.034	0.895	-0.072	0.063
Born in Denmark (0-1)	0.140	0.160	0.383	-0.175	0.454
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.246	0.035	0.000	0.178	0.314
Job status (0-1)	-0.056	0.081	0.489	-0.214	0.102
History of activism (0-2)	0.119	0.042	0.005	0.036	0.202
Constant	5.131	0.274	0.000	4.595	5.668

n=3,452. R<sup>2</sup>=.055. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AIV. Trust in police (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	-0.184	0.089	0.038	-0.359	-0.010
Male (0-1)	-0.134	0.083	0.107	-0.297	0.029
Age (Years)	0.001	0.002	0.835	-0.004	0.005
Self-transcendent values (0-4)	0.025	0.029	0.387	-0.031	0.081
Self-enhancement values (0-4)	-0.044	0.059	0.453	-0.159	0.071
Civil status (0-1)	0.258	0.078	0.001	0.105	0.411
Children in household (0-1)	0.126	0.083	0.128	-0.036	0.288
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5)	-0.014	0.029	0.623	-0.072	0.043
Political attitude (0-10)	0.166	0.016	0.000	0.134	0.198
Member of national church (0-1)	0.471	0.079	0.000	0.317	0.626
Church attendance frequency (1-5)	0.059	0.033	0.074	-0.006	0.124
Born in Denmark (0-1)	0.106	0.156	0.495	-0.199	0.411
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.038	0.034	0.265	-0.029	0.104
Job status (0-1)	0.049	0.078	0.528	-0.104	0.203
History of activism (0-2)	0.063	0.041	0.124	-0.017	0.144
Constant	6.068	0.265	0.000	5.548	6.588

n=3,452. R<sup>2</sup>= .088. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AV.  $\gamma$ -coefficient for relation between activity and decline in institutional trust

Activity	Loss of institutional trust			Avg. org. Cap. (0-18)	n
	Parliament	Legal syst.	Police		
Posting on Facebook	0.31***	0.21***	0.05	7.99	1,447
Liking and sharing Facebook posts	0.32***	0.15*	0.09	7.96	1,706
Petitioning	0.43***	0.30***	0.31***	7.98	1,009
Collecting and donating goods	0.24***	0.01	-0.02	8.05	1,511
Collecting and donating money	0.23***	0.19**	0.11	8.12	1,065
Intercultural activity	0.10*	0.09	-0.03	8.11	1,152
Contact-person for refugees	0.07	0.03	-0.08	8.12	846
Demonstrations and happenings	0.33***	0.31***	0.42***	8.03	597
Civil disobedient direct action	0.25	0.51***	0.64***	8.63	76
legal assistance	0.14*	0.13*	0.22*	8.14	369
Assisting newly arrived refugees	0.24**	0.13	0.16	8.33	195
Illegal transportation of refugees	0.18	0.56***	0.56**	8.10	29
Hiding refugees from authorities	-0.01	0.57**	0.67**	7.64	14
Econ. support to underground refugees	0.31**	0.32**	0.4***	8.33	118
Other support to underground refugees	0.14	0.32	0.5**	8.63	41
Refugees living in private home	0.32**	0.41***	0.47***	8.17	94

Note: \*\*\*= $\chi^2$  p-value<0.001; \*\*= $\chi^2$  p-value<0.01; \*= $\chi^2$  p-value<0.05.  
For cell-fill: Light grey=  $0.1 < \gamma < 0.2$ ; medium grey=  $0.2 < \gamma < 0.4$ ; Dark grey=  $0.4 < \gamma$

The movement has a broad repertoire. The items measuring the repertoire are listed in table AV. The same activist may have performed all 16 kinds of activities in the repertoire. The mean is 4.5 with a S.D. of 2.5. The  $\gamma$ -coefficients express the activities relation to loss of institutional trust and grey cell-fill indicates the strength of the relation. Almost all activities of the repertoire relate to a significant loss of trust in parliament, whereas the relations to loss of trust in the legal system and the police are more varied. The fifth column is a measure of integration in civil society or the activists organizational capital. Depending on present and prior membership as well as status as active in different kinds of civil society organizations, the respondent can obtain a score from 0-18. The score increases with the number of kinds of associations the respondent are related to. Here it reveals that there is only minor differences in the civil society integration between those engaged in the different kinds of activities. This is taken to justify that a loss of institutional trust related to the different activities are equally related to the civic engagement and civil society.

Table AVI. Kinds of activity and loss of institutional trust – all controls

Covariates	Parliament			Legal system			Police		
	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value
Political activism (0-6)	0.237	0.033	0.000	0.145	0.039	0.000	0.101	0.054	0.061
Civil disobedience (0-2)	0.293	0.164	0.073	0.418	0.139	0.003	0.574	0.167	0.001
Humanitarian activity (0-4)	0.029	0.049	0.558	0.049	0.054	0.363	-0.073	0.076	0.341
Income (1-10)	-0.117	0.064	0.070	-0.182	0.075	0.015	-0.143	0.107	0.179
<i>Occupation</i>									
Full time	Reference			Reference			Reference		
Part time	0.105	0.203	0.605	0.027	0.241	0.912	0.013	0.345	0.971
Self-employed	-0.096	0.199	0.631	0.599	0.222	0.007	0.208	0.349	0.552
Education	0.020	0.248	0.934	-0.015	0.271	0.956	-0.526	0.373	0.158
Unemployed	0.047	0.329	0.886	0.584	0.340	0.086	-0.047	0.484	0.922
Early retiree	0.028	0.304	0.928	0.445	0.323	0.167	0.096	0.458	0.833
Pensioner	-0.115	0.256	0.654	0.307	0.301	0.307	0.456	0.417	0.275
Other	-0.290	0.250	0.245	0.303	0.293	0.301	0.403	0.400	0.314
Work time (1-5)	-0.049	0.050	0.326	0.031	0.060	0.604	-0.062	0.088	0.486
Education (1-5)	0.020	0.058	0.729	-0.095	0.062	0.126	-0.143	0.083	0.086
<i>Gender</i>									
Female	Reference			Reference			Reference		
Male	-0.088	0.147	0.547	0.006	0.171	0.971	0.574	0.208	0.006
Do not identify as either	-1.486	0.644	0.021	-0.066	0.701	0.925	1.059	0.739	0.152
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	-0.033	0.045	0.459	-0.048	0.049	0.328	0.027	0.068	0.695
Children in household (0-1)	-0.066	0.123	0.591	-0.119	0.139	0.393	-0.511	0.200	0.011
Age (Years)	0.010	0.006	0.091	-0.003	0.007	0.651	-0.015	0.009	0.096
Refugee (0-1)	-0.430	0.313	0.170	0.025	0.322	0.938	-0.317	0.406	0.435
Active in party (0-1)	-0.422	0.176	0.017	0.003	0.200	0.986	0.136	0.258	0.599
Active in union (0-1)	-0.125	0.164	0.445	-0.020	0.191	0.915	0.033	0.253	0.895
Active in religious ass. (0-1)	0.097	0.189	0.606	-0.522	0.235	0.027	0.090	0.317	0.776
Active in sports ass. (0-1)	-0.163	0.112	0.145	-0.065	0.133	0.625	-0.224	0.192	0.245
Active in other ass. (0-1)	-0.141	0.113	0.213	0.035	0.128	0.786	0.030	0.177	0.864
Active prior to Sept. (0-1)	0.085	0.108	0.428	0.129	0.125	0.304	0.268	0.177	0.130
History of other act. (0-6)	-0.008	0.043	0.859	-0.050	0.053	0.346	-0.088	0.078	0.257
History of refugee act. (0-5)	0.024	0.056	0.663	0.023	0.065	0.719	0.150	0.089	0.090
Self-transcendent values (1-8)	0.125	0.029	0.000	0.090	0.035	0.011	0.100	0.050	0.046
Self-enhancement val. (1-8)	0.061	0.037	0.098	-0.012	0.042	0.776	0.064	0.058	0.273
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.263	0.062	0.000	-0.138	0.073	0.058	-0.316	0.106	0.003
<i>Religion</i>									
None	Reference			Reference			Reference		
National Danish Church	0.002	0.132	0.989	-0.139	0.153	0.365	-0.118	0.220	0.591
Islam	-0.150	0.391	0.700	0.406	0.384	0.290	0.874	0.466	0.061
Other	0.138	0.264	0.602	0.233	0.264	0.377	0.313	0.344	0.362
Church attendance freq. (1-5)	-0.004	0.062	0.943	0.094	0.071	0.183	0.046	0.098	0.638
Generalized trust (1-4)	-0.085	0.099	0.394	-0.201	0.113	0.076	-0.116	0.156	0.457
Constant	0.708	0.860	0.410	-0.631	0.930	0.498	-0.558	1.233	0.651
df=35	n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.078.			n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.066.			n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.107.		



Table AVII. Kinds of activity and loss of institutional trust – reduced models

Covariates	Parliament			Legal system			Police		
	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value
Political activism (0-6)	0.235	0.032	0.000	0.145	0.038	0.000	0.105	0.052	0.045
Civil disobedience (0-2)	0.294	0.161	0.068	0.389	0.135	0.004	0.586	0.161	0.000
Humanitarian activity (0-4)	0.043	0.047	0.364	0.070	0.051	0.168	-0.059	0.072	0.407
Income (1-10)	-0.089	0.046	0.054	-0.225	0.053	0.000	-0.204	0.074	0.006
<i>Gender</i>									
Female	Reference			Reference			Reference		
Male	-0.078	0.143	0.584	0.024	0.167	0.886	0.640	0.201	0.001
Do not identify as either	-1.660	0.647	0.010	0.059	0.686	0.932	0.970	0.725	0.181
Children in household (0-1)	-0.131	0.108	0.223	-0.151	0.124	0.224	-0.549	0.183	0.003
Active in party (0-1)	-0.421	0.172	0.014	0.059	0.195	0.761	0.203	0.248	0.414
Self-transcendent values (1-8)	0.114	0.028	0.000	0.095	0.035	0.006	0.108	0.049	0.027
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.257	0.059	0.000	-0.129	0.070	0.065	-0.311	0.101	0.002
<i>Religion</i>									
None	Reference			Reference			Reference		
National Danish Church	0.059	0.109	0.589	-0.130	0.129	0.315	-0.068	0.185	0.715
Islam	-0.139	0.373	0.709	0.433	0.359	0.227	1.021	0.415	0.014
Other	0.200	0.249	0.424	0.238	0.246	0.333	0.413	0.315	0.191
Generalized trust (1-4)	-0.105	0.097	0.282	-0.225	0.111	0.043	-0.161	0.152	0.290
Constant	0.468	0.394	0.235	-0.800	0.453	0.077	-1.527	0.628	0.015
df=14	n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.070.			n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.055.			n=1,910. Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> =.089.		

Table AVIII. ‘How important is it *That all citizens have an adequate standard of Living?*’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.079	0.042	0.059	-0.003	0.160
Male (0-1)	-0.218	0.040	0.000	-0.296	-0.141
Age (Years)	0.003	0.001	0.019	0.000	0.005
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	-0.042	0.017	0.014	-0.075	-0.008
Job status (0-1)	-0.144	0.038	0.000	-0.218	-0.069
Children in household (0-1)	0.023	0.041	0.564	-0.056	0.103
Civil status (0-1)	-0.040	0.040	0.317	-0.119	0.038
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.014	0.018	0.449	-0.022	0.049
History of activism (0-2)	-0.011	0.010	0.264	-0.030	0.008
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.112	0.007	0.000	-0.126	-0.098
Constant	6.974	0.114	0.000	6.750	7.197

n=3,092. R<sup>2</sup>=.131. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AIX. ‘How important is it *That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities?*’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.178	0.041	0.000	0.097	0.259
Male (0-1)	-0.115	0.039	0.003	-0.192	-0.038
Age (Years)	0.009	0.001	0.000	0.007	0.012
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.031	0.017	0.066	-0.002	0.064
Job status (0-1)	-0.128	0.038	0.001	-0.202	-0.054
Children in household (0-1)	0.037	0.040	0.362	-0.042	0.115
Civil status (0-1)	-0.031	0.040	0.438	-0.109	0.047
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.014	0.018	0.425	-0.021	0.050
History of activism (0-2)	0.017	0.009	0.072	-0.002	0.036
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.090	0.007	0.000	-0.104	-0.076
Constant	6.121	0.113	0.000	5.899	6.342

n=3,092. R<sup>2</sup>=.133. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AX. ‘How important is it *That people be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making?*’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	-0.141	0.056	0.012	-0.251	-0.032
Male (0-1)	-0.079	0.053	0.138	-0.183	0.025
Age (Years)	0.006	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.009
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	-0.045	0.023	0.048	-0.090	0.000
Job status (0-1)	0.039	0.051	0.453	-0.062	0.139
Children in household (0-1)	-0.140	0.055	0.010	-0.247	-0.033
Civil status (0-1)	-0.139	0.054	0.010	-0.245	-0.034
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.001	0.024	0.968	-0.047	0.049
History of activism (0-2)	0.004	0.013	0.755	-0.021	0.029
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.102	0.010	0.000	-0.121	-0.084
Constant	6.261	0.153	0.000	5.960	6.561

n=3,092. R<sup>2</sup>=.050. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXI. ‘How important is it *That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions.?*’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.443	0.081	0.000	0.285	0.602
Male (0-1)	0.198	0.077	0.010	0.048	0.348
Age (Years)	-0.004	0.002	0.100	-0.008	0.001
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.028	0.033	0.387	-0.036	0.093
Job status (0-1)	-0.159	0.074	0.032	-0.304	-0.014
Children in household (0-1)	-0.111	0.079	0.156	-0.266	0.043
Civil status (0-1)	-0.275	0.078	0.000	-0.427	-0.123
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.069	0.035	0.050	0.000	0.138
History of activism (0-2)	0.049	0.019	0.009	0.012	0.085
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.185	0.014	0.000	-0.212	-0.158
Constant	5.032	0.221	0.000	4.599	5.465

n=3,092. R<sup>2</sup>=.116. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXII. ‘How important is it *That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances*’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.216	0.046	0.000	0.127	0.306
Male (0-1)	0.045	0.043	0.300	-0.040	0.130
Age (Years)	0.006	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.008
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	0.069	0.019	0.000	0.033	0.106
Job status (0-1)	-0.053	0.042	0.211	-0.135	0.030
Children in household (0-1)	-0.046	0.045	0.306	-0.133	0.042
Civil status (0-1)	-0.096	0.044	0.030	-0.182	-0.009
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.032	0.020	0.114	-0.008	0.071
History of activism (0-2)	0.013	0.011	0.212	-0.008	0.034
Political attitude (0-10)	-0.049	0.008	0.000	-0.064	-0.033
Constant	5.823	0.125	0.000	5.577	6.068

n=3,092. R<sup>2</sup>=.059. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXIII. Petitioning prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Odds ratio	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	0.407	0.038	0.000	0.339	0.487
Male (0-1)	1.011	0.087	0.895	0.854	1.198
Age (Years)	1.011	0.003	0.000	1.005	1.016
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.143	0.043	0.000	1.061	1.231
Job status (0-1)	1.231	0.110	0.020	1.034	1.466
Children in household (0-1)	1.107	0.104	0.278	0.921	1.331
Civil status (0-1)	1.381	0.132	0.001	1.146	1.665
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.945	0.039	0.167	0.872	1.024
Constant	0.226	0.056	0.000	0.139	0.367

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.044. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXIV. Product boycott prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Odds ratio	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.203	0.123	0.072	0.984	1.470
Male (0-1)	0.985	0.100	0.884	0.807	1.203
Age (Years)	1.015	0.003	0.000	1.009	1.022
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.051	0.047	0.267	0.963	1.146
Job status (0-1)	1.257	0.130	0.027	1.026	1.540
Children in household (0-1)	1.288	0.138	0.018	1.044	1.588
Civil status (0-1)	1.223	0.133	0.065	0.988	1.515
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	1.038	0.049	0.430	0.946	1.139
Constant	0.060	0.018	0.000	0.033	0.108

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.015. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXV. Demonstration prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Odds ratio	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.616	0.145	0.000	1.355	1.928
Male (0-1)	0.794	0.073	0.012	0.663	0.951
Age (Years)	1.005	0.003	0.070	1.000	1.011
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.338	0.055	0.000	1.235	1.450
Job status (0-1)	1.152	0.104	0.119	0.964	1.375
Children in household (0-1)	1.121	0.106	0.229	0.931	1.350
Civil status (0-1)	1.074	0.101	0.451	0.892	1.292
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.968	0.041	0.448	0.892	1.052
Constant	0.100	0.026	0.000	0.060	0.167

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.044. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXVI. Political meeting prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Odds ratio	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.351	0.121	0.001	1.133	1.611
Male (0-1)	1.036	0.092	0.694	0.870	1.234
Age (Years)	1.017	0.003	0.000	1.011	1.022
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.151	0.045	0.000	1.066	1.242
Job status (0-1)	1.102	0.099	0.280	0.924	1.313
Children in household (0-1)	1.128	0.107	0.205	0.936	1.358
Civil status (0-1)	1.028	0.096	0.765	0.856	1.234
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.952	0.039	0.228	0.878	1.032
Constant	0.114	0.029	0.000	0.069	0.188

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.023. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXVII. Contact politician prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Odds ratio	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.934	0.204	0.000	1.573	2.378
Male (0-1)	1.070	0.114	0.524	0.869	1.317
Age (Years)	1.023	0.004	0.000	1.016	1.030
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.104	0.052	0.036	1.007	1.211
Job status (0-1)	1.363	0.147	0.004	1.104	1.682
Children in household (0-1)	1.220	0.136	0.075	0.980	1.518
Civil status (0-1)	1.162	0.129	0.176	0.935	1.445
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.907	0.043	0.040	0.827	0.995
Constant	0.038	0.012	0.000	0.020	0.072

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.043. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXVIII. Donated money prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.070	0.106	0.493	0.881	1.301
Male (0-1)	0.978	0.096	0.825	0.807	1.187
Age (Years)	0.998	0.003	0.583	0.993	1.004
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.066	0.045	0.129	0.982	1.157
Job status (0-1)	0.946	0.092	0.570	0.782	1.145
Children in household (0-1)	1.076	0.111	0.480	0.878	1.318
Civil status (0-1)	0.869	0.087	0.163	0.714	1.058
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	1.051	0.049	0.289	0.959	1.151
Constant	0.237	0.063	0.000	0.140	0.399

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.003. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXIX. Contact the media prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	2.061	0.235	0.000	1.648	2.578
Male (0-1)	1.047	0.122	0.694	0.834	1.314
Age (Years)	1.017	0.004	0.000	1.010	1.025
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.197	0.062	0.001	1.081	1.326
Job status (0-1)	1.154	0.132	0.210	0.922	1.443
Children in household (0-1)	1.000	0.122	1.000	0.788	1.270
Civil status (0-1)	0.885	0.102	0.287	0.706	1.109
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	0.900	0.046	0.041	0.814	0.996
Constant	0.041	0.014	0.000	0.021	0.079

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.043. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.

Table AXX. Expressed political views on internet prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new movement members in September

Covariate	Coefficient	S.E.	p-value	95% Confidence interval	
Population-Movement (0-1)	1.947	0.261	0.000	1.498	2.532
Male (0-1)	1.345	0.178	0.025	1.037	1.743
Age (Years)	0.982	0.004	0.000	0.974	0.990
Level of educational attainment (1-5)	1.121	0.064	0.045	1.002	1.255
Job status (0-1)	1.378	0.182	0.015	1.064	1.786
Children in household (0-1)	1.102	0.143	0.455	0.854	1.422
Civil status (0-1)	0.854	0.112	0.232	0.660	1.106
Degree of urbanization (1-5)	1.014	0.063	0.828	0.897	1.145
Constant	0.111	0.039	0.000	0.055	0.221

n=3,022. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.036. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample.